Bringing OT Security to the Boardroom
Read time 7 mins
In Operational Technology (OT) environments and with industrial control systems (ICS), which are a key component of OT, board-level decisions directly shape how organisations prepare for and respond to cyber risks. So, if you’re sitting at the top table, know this: the resilience of your organisation starts with how seriously you take OT security.
OT is made up of the hardware and software systems that control industrial processes and essential public functions: from power grid controls and factory robotics to water treatment plants, transport signalling, and hospital medical devices. It’s tempting to think of these systems as ‘just computers’ but, really, they’re the systems that make modern life possible.
Historically, OT systems were isolated, purpose-built, and rarely connected to the internet. Engineers monitored them, not CISOs. Back then, that separation acted as ‘accidental’ cyber security. However, the drive for efficiency, remote monitoring, and real-time analytics has brought OT and IT together, creating enormous operational leverage – and a vastly expanded attack surface to boot.
This convergence has disrupted traditional security models like the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture – a foundational framework for ICS and OT networks that once neatly separated industrial systems into hierarchical layers; from physical processes at the bottom to enterprise systems at the top. In its original form, the Purdue model relied on strong boundaries between levels, assuming trust within each zone. But in today’s interconnected environments, those boundaries are porous, and trust can no longer be assumed.
If you are responsible for OT operations, this isn’t a hypothetical. Your turbines, pumps, conveyor belts, or medical devices are now part of a connected ecosystem. A cyber intrusion could stop production, compromise safety systems, or disable critical services. And because OT leaders are ultimately custodians of these assets, the responsibility lands squarely on your board.
Detection and response in a modern OT/IT converged environment, especially one modeled on the Purdue architecture, requires a layered, adaptive approach that respects the unique characteristics of industrial systems while embracing modern cyber security principles like Zero Trust. For ICS and OT operators, the stakes are immediate: every boardroom decision about security, investment, or staffing has a direct impact on operational resilience, regulatory compliance, and the safety of people and the environment.
Here’s the deal: if your OT isn’t secure, your business continuity plan is on shaky ground. It’s that simple.
The business impact of OT cyber attacks
OT cyber security incidents hit where it hurts: operations. A compromise inside a control system can halt an entire production line or disable critical infrastructure. Consider a water utility plant: a complex network of pumps, sensors, and control systems working around the clock to deliver safe water to thousands of homes. A breach here that manipulates treatment plant sensors could lead to service disruptions, public health risks, and even trigger regulatory fallout. Similarly, in manufacturing, an attacker could freeze or misconfigure assembly lines, causing millions in lost production, cancelled orders, and penalties for missed contracts.
Industry research shows OT-related breaches are growing in frequency and severity. The average cost of downtime in manufacturing or energy sectors is now estimated at £200,000 per hour. And that doesn’t account for reputational harm or regulatory scrutiny, consequences that – yes! – fall squarely on boards overseeing OT/ICS operations.
Security lapses here are not IT inconveniences; they are business continuity crises that threaten revenue, compliance, and operational integrity.
Why OT security is different (and more dangerous)
OT systems differ fundamentally from IT. A corporate network failure may disrupt emails and online business, e.g., but a compromised OT system can damage machinery, interrupt essential services, and even endanger human life.
OT environments are often:
Legacy-heavy: with decades-old hardware and proprietary software designed for reliability, not security.
Real-time critical: where downtime for updates or patching can halt production or compromise safety.
Physically consequential: with potential to impact equipment, environment, or people.
These systems operate differently: ICS, for example, is designed for repetitive, predictable tasks such as monitoring chemical levels in water treatment. That predictability is actually a strength because it allows for highly effective anomaly detection. If something deviates from the expected, such as unexpected logins or unauthorised configuration changes, it’s a strong signal that something may be wrong.
This is where monitoring becomes critical. Leaders must not only understand the risks but also allocate funding to ensure they can detect suspicious behaviour and respond quickly. That includes having the ability to trace an intrusion back through the system and isolate compromised areas. The Purdue model helps here: by segmenting systems into hierarchical levels, it allows defenders to identify where an attacker entered – often starting at the top in Windows based systems – and follow their path down into more bespoke, critical layers.
Effective governance must span both digital and physical domains, ensuring that if a breach occurs, access can be closed off at any level to contain the threat. This isn’t optional, either Non-compliance now carries legal and financial penalties – and in some cases, personal liability for executives (although most legal actions have historically targeted companies, the tide is shifting).
Regulators are also stepping up, making it clear that cyber risk is a board-level responsibility. The UK’s NIS2 directive, for example, extends cyber security obligations to critical OT infrastructure, while COMAH-OG 0086 makes it clear: cyber threats to industrial automation systems are now a matter of safety too.
Elevating OT security to the C-Suite
Leading OT organisations are taking action by bringing OT security under the remit of the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) or centralising it within enterprise risk functions. This is a significant shift that enables clearer oversight, stronger threat intelligence across IT and OT domains, and faster, more coordinated incident response.
Integration is just the starting point. Boards need to treat OT security as a strategic governance issue. It’s a matter of:
- Protecting the operational backbone of the business.
- Maintaining continuity of services that impact employees, customers, and communities.
- Meeting regulatory expectations that are becoming more specific and demanding.
- Showing leadership in resilience and safety, which investors and stakeholders increasingly expect.
Some forward-thinking organisations are already embedding OT security metrics into ESG reporting, reinforcing the message that operational resilience is now part of corporate responsibility.
Why does this matter? Because ESG isn’t just about carbon footprints and board diversity anymore. Investors, insurers, and regulators are increasingly scrutinising how companies manage risk – especially the kind that can disrupt essential services, endanger safety, or expose communities to harm. OT systems sit at the heart of these risks.
Consider this: there are companies out there making life-saving cancer treatments every day. If an ICS system goes down, it could mean someone doesn’t get the treatment they need. How do you put a price on that? We might spend £200,000 securing an industrial control system, but the real cost of failure could be measured in human lives.
By embedding OT security into ESG frameworks, organisations are showing they understand the broader impact of operational failures. They’re also sending a clear message: we take resilience seriously, and we’re willing to be transparent about it. This kind of reporting sets a benchmark. And for boards, it’s an opportunity to lead from the front.
Building a board-Level OT security strategy
As cyber-physical threats grow more complex (according to IBM’s X-Force Threat Intelligence Index, the UK was the most attacked country in Europe), OT leaders must drive a strategy that protects their own operations and accounts for dependencies across suppliers and critical infrastructure.
Key steps should include:
Comprehensive OT risk assessments: identify vulnerable assets, map interdependencies, and catalogue potential attack vectors.
Adoption of recognised frameworks: standards like ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST 800-82 offer actionable guidance for OT security.
Enhanced visibility and segmentation: deploy monitoring tools that detect anomalies in real-time and isolate critical systems from lateral threats.
Culture of security awareness: ensure operators and engineers are trained to recognise risks and respond appropriately.
Integrated incident response: coordinate between OT teams, IT, and suppliers to reduce downtime and contain impact.
Final word
For boards of OT organisations, OT and ICS security has become a non-negotiable. It underpins operational resilience, regulatory compliance, and the trust placed in your organisation by employees, customers, and the wider public. Decisions made at the top – about funding, governance, and risk management – have direct, tangible consequences on the ground.
Whether you’re overseeing a factory, hospital, power network, or water treatment facility, your role extends beyond internal operations. OT boards are custodians of systems that support essential services across society. Overlooking cyber-physical risk puts communities, reputations, and critical infrastructure at risk.
Hopefully, the mandate is clear: make OT security a board-level priority. Fund it, oversee it, and embed it into every layer of organisational resilience.
Whether you’re just starting to connect OT with wider networks or you’re already dealing with the complexities of convergence, Littlefish can help you take control of your operational technology security. Get in touch to find out more.
